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fore, reasonably might expect Leo to take improbable." Delzell v. Day, 36 Cal.Zd 
further care for his own safety by again 349, 351, 223 P.2d 625, 626. 
iooking toward the approaching truck dur- I am in full accord with the views ex-
ing the crossint' and concludes that "it pressed in the learned and able opinion 
cannot be said, as a matter of law, that of the District Court of Appeal, Second Ap-
. Dunham was negligent in failing to antici- pellate District, Division Three, prepared by 
pate until the truck was some 60 to 80 feet Mr. Presiding Justice Shinn when this case 
from Leo thaI Leo was not going to yield was before that court, 248 P.2d 935, 937. By 
the right of way." The fact remains that unanimous decision of. that court a reversal 
it cannot be said as a matter of law that was ordered because Hthe instruction [sud-
defendant was not negligent. Plaintiff's den emergency] should not have been given 
failure to watch for approaching vehicles and we have no w.ay of knowing that the 
goes to the issue of contributory negligence. jtlrors were not misled, or that the verdict 
In order for the doctrine to apply to de- would have been the same if the inst:ruction 
fendant's conduct, there must have been no had not been given. See Wright v. Sni'f-
negligence, as a matter of law, on his part fin, supra, 80 Ca1.App.2d 358, 365, 181 P.2d 
until he was confronted yvith the sudden 675." . 
emergency. Under the facts presented I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
here, it cannot be said, as "a 'matter of law, 
that defendant was exercising the care of 
the ordinarily prudent man in assuming 
that plaintiff' would turn and see his ve-
hicle approaching. And, the, fact does re-
main that defendant was at all times aware 
that plaintiff was walking across the road-
way without looking in his direction. As a 
result, there was no basis in thc evidence of 
the ,instrllctieJ:1. The giving of ail instruc-
tion whieh is u'nsupportcd by the evidence 
has been held to constitute reversible errer, 
Scandalis v. Jenny, 132 Ca1.App. 307, 22 
P.2d 545; Davenport v. Stratton, 24 Cal. 
2d 232, 149 P.2d 4. The instruction on 
sudden emergency, under the facts of this 
case, was inconsistent with the instruction 
en negligence as it applied to the de-
fendant. It is impossible to ascertain here 
whether the jury found that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent, or that defendant 
was free from negligence, or that defend-
ant was excused from the consquences of 
his negligence because he was confronted 
with a sudden emergency. Instructions 
contradictory in essential elements may war-
rant a reversal on thc ground that it can-
not be ascertained which instruction was 
followed by the jury, Carlson v. Shewalter, 
110 Ca1.App.2d 655, 243 P.2d 549; Rack-
son v. Benioff, 111 Cal.App.2d 124, 244 P. 
2d 9; Cannis v. Di Salvo Trucking Co., 
111 Cal.App.2d 893, 245 P.2d 365. With-
out the instruction on sudden emergency 
/fa different verdict would not have been 
o i K""='''"''''=''-'''''''''''''''' , 
41 Cal.2d 785 
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO. 
v. 
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. et al. 
S. F. 18792. 
Supreme COUl't of California. 
In Bank, 
Dec. 18, 1053. 
Action by cempensation carrier for em-
ployer whose employee sustained an in-
dustrial injury aUcgecily caused by neg-
ligence of two third party defendants, 
wherein complaint contained four causes 
of action, including those for compensa-
tion benefits paid to employee and for gen-
eral tort damages suffered by employee. 
The Superior Court, San Francisco County, 
Theresa Meikle, J., dismissed cause of ac-
tion for employee's general tort damages 
against one of third party defendants. 
Compensation insurance carrier appealed, 
The Supreme Court, Spence, J., held that 
one year statute of limitations as to per-
sonal injury action wa's applicable to statu-
tory action by insul:anee carrier against 
third party tort-feasor for employee's gen-
eral tort damages and not three year stat-
6 Ca!. ·264 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERlE,S 
/ 
ute of limitations as to liabilities 'created by 
statute. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Carter, Shenk, and Traynor, JJ., dis-
sented. 
Prior opinion, 251 P.2d 762. 
t. Limitation of Actions ¢:;:)31 
One year statute of limitations as to 
personal injury actions was applicable to 
statutory action hy insurance carrier against 
third-party tort-feasor for injuries to em-
ployee of insured and· not general three 
year statute, of limitations as, to liabilities 
created by statute. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 338, 
subd. I, § 340, suM. 3; Labor Code, §§ 
3850, 3852. 
2. Appeal and Error <$=>79(1) 
Nonappearance of one alleged third-
party defendant in action against two third-
,party defendants did not preclude judgment 
with respect to the appearing third-party 
defendant from being a final appealable 
judgment. Code Civ.Proc. § 963. 
3. Workmen's Compensation ~2242 
Where causes of action for compen-
sation benefits paid to employee who al-
legedly sustained an industrial 1l1Jury 
caused by negligence of two third-party 
defendants and causes of action for em-
ployee's general tort damages were brought 
by employer's compensation insurance car-
rier against each of two third-party defend-
ants and a demurrer to cause of action for 
employee's general tort damages brought 
against one third-party defendant was sus-
tained, resulting judgment of dismissal was 
a final judgment and was therefore appeal-
able. Code Civ.Proe. §§ 338, suM. I, 579, 
963; Labor Code § 3854. 
Belli, Ashe & Pinney and Van H. Pin-
ney, San Francisco, for appellant. 
Partridge, O'Connell & Whitney and 
"Vallace O'Connell, San Francisco, for re-
spondent. 
SPENCE, Justice. 
Plaintiff is the compensation insurance 
carrier for an employer whose employee 
sustained an industrial inj ury allegedly 
caused by the negligence of third party 
defendants. In its fourth cause o-f action 
plaintiff sought to rec<?v~r the employeels 
general tort' damages. The action was 
brought -more than one year but less than 
three years after' occurrence of the acci-
dent which caused the injury. A ,demurrer 
to this. fourth cause of action was sustained 
without leave to amend, and from the judg-
ment of dismissal accordingly ente.red, 
plaintiff appeals. 
[1] The determinative question is 
whether the fourth cause of action is gov-
erned by the one-year statute of limitations 
applicable to an action for damages "for 
injury to * * * one caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another", 'Code 
Civ.Proc. sec. 340, subd. 3, or the three-
year statute applicable to an action Hup,on 
a liability created by statute", Code Civ. 
Proc. sec. 338, subd. 1. The Labor Code 
authorizes the employer or its insurance 
carrier to 'bring an action against the third 
party tort-feasor, sees. 3850, 3852, and to 
include therein the general damages to the 
employee as well as the special damages to 
the employer for compensation and medical 
benefits, sec. 3854. Assuming without de-
ciding, that this liability of the tort-feasor 
to the employer or its insurance carrier for 
the employee's general damages is one cre-
ated by statute, d. Limited Mutual Compo 
Ins. Co. v. Billings, 74 Cal.App.2d 881, 884-
885, 169 P.2d 673, nevertheless under set-
tled legal principles the trial court correctly 
concluded that the one-year statute applied. 
The employee's general damage claim, 
whether prosecuted by the employee per-
sonally or by his employer or its insurance 
carrier on his behalf, is solely one in tort 
for personal injuries arising out of the 
negligence of the third party tort-feasor; 
hence the cause of action accrues at the 
time of the negligent act. No matter who 
may be the party plaintiff, the cause of ac-
tion is one within the express terms of 
subdivision 3 of section 340 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. That section is a 
special statute controlling the time within 
which any action covering such injury 'may 
be commenced, and it prevails over the geri-
eral statute applicable to actions based upon 
a "liability created by statute". Code eiv. 
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Proe. sec. 338, subd. 1. In line with this first is against the Pacific Gas and Elec-
principle, the one-year statute has been tric Company to recover on plaintiff's own 
held applicable to all actioll for personal behalf the sum of $1,684.12, beiug the al-
injuries based upon the liahility of the own- lcged amount of compensation benefits paid 
er of an automobile for imputed negiigcnce by it to the injured employee; the second 
of the driver thereof under section 402 of is against the Pacific Gas and Electric 
the Vehicle Code. Franceschi v. Scott, 7 Company to recover as statutory trustee for 
Cal.App.2d 494, 495-496, 46 P.2d 764, and the injured employee, Labor Code, § 3854, 
to an actioll: for personal iuj uries hased up- the sum of $50,000, being the alleg-cd gen-
on the liability of the driver's parents who eral damages suffered by the injurcd em-
had signed and verified the driver's applica- pIoyee; the third is similar to the first 
tion for an operator's license as required but against Bechtel Corporation to recover 
by section 352 of the Vehicle Code. Mc- on plaintiff's own behalf the same alleged 
Farland v. Cordiero, 99 Ca1.App. 352, 354- amount of compensation "benefits paid by it 
355, 278 P. 889. Certainly if such prin.- to the injured employee; and the fourth is 
ciple applies in cases where a new person, s-imilar to the second but against Bechtel 
by virtue of statutory authority, may be Corporation to recover as statutory trustee 
sued on a persona1 injury claim, see Ridley for the injured employee the same alleged 
v. Young, 64 ·CaI.App.2d 503, 509, 149 P.2d general damages suffered by him. Defend-
76, it should apply here where. a new per- ant Pacific Gas and Electric Company has 
son, under statutory authority, may sue on never appeared in the action. 
a personal injury claim. There is nothing 
in the Labor Code, sees. 3850-3863, which 
would indicate an intention to impqse a' 
greater 'burden on the tort-feasor if recovery 
ori the employee's damage claim is sought by 
the employer or its insurance carrier rather 
than the injured employee insofar as the 
time of suit is concerned. The tort liability 
to respond in general damages on the per-
sonal injury claim remains the same. To 
hold otherwise would produce'the anomalous 
result whereby the employee's tort action 
would be barred if he. undertook to prose-
cute it and yet the employer or its insurance 
carrier could recover damages at a later 
date for the employee on that same cause 
of action. Accordingly, plaintiff unavail-
ingly argues that its IIfourth cause of ac-
tion" is gov~rned by the gen:eral three-
year statute -of limitations applicahle to a 
"liability created by statute", Code Civ. 
Proc. § 338, subd. 1. 
[2,3] During the pendency of the ap-
peal it was suggested that the judgment of 
dismissal of the fourth cause of action 
was not a final judgment, and was there-
fore not appealable. Code Civ.Proc. § 963. 
Counsel were then askcd to stipulate re-
garding the status of the record. Accord-
ing to their stipulation, the complaint was 
filed with one plaintiff and two defendants 
and embodied four causes of action: the 
The nonappearance of defendant Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company in this action 
does not preclude the judgment with re-
spect to the other appearing defendant 
from being a final appealable judgment. 
Rocca v. Steinmetz, 189 Cal. 426, 428, 208 
P. %4; Howe v. Key System Transit Co., 
198 Cal. 525, 529, 246 P. 39; Young v. 
Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 211, 215, 105 P.2d 
363; Weisz v. McKee, 31 Cal.App.2d 144, 
147, 87 P.2d 379, 88 P.2d 200. While there 
appears to 'he no authority on the effect of 
the admitted nonadjudication of the third 
cause of action in relation to the finality of 
the judgment entered on the fourth cause 
of action in favor of the same defendant, 
Bechtel Corporation, practical considera-
tions and legal principles sustain the propri-
ety -of treating these two causes of action 
as separate matters for litigation in the 
discretion of the court. See Code Civ. 
Proc. § 579. 
The judgment on the fourth cause of ac-
tion was a final determination of the rights 
of plaintiff as statutory trustee seeking to 
recover general damages for the benefit of 
the injured employee. As a final determi-
nation of the rights of plaintiff in that ca-
pacity, such judgment should be regarded 
as having the same measure of ,finality as 
would a similar judgment in an action 
in which there were two plaintiffs seeking 
8 Cal. 264 PACIFIO REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
their respective damages from .the same de-
fendant on two severable causes of action: 
(1) the insurance carrier f0r recovety of" 
its own compensation expenditures;, and 
(2) the injured employee for recovery of' 
his own general damages. Such cases as 
Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal.2d 617, 55 P.2d 
1174, and Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Ca1.2d 
228, 93 P.2d 100, involve an entirely dif-
ferent situation in that there each of the 
suc;cessive judgments left undetermined be-
tween the same parties in their same indi-
vidual capacities another alleged cause or 
causes of action for the same identical re-
lief. Under the circumstances here, we 
conclude that the judgment of dismissal of 
the fourth cause of action is a ,final judg-
ment within the meaning of section %3 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure and is :there-
fore appealable. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
GIBSON, C. J., and EDMONDS and, 
SCHAUER, JJ., concur. 
third and cla:ims damages to Cabella of 
$50,000. 
Apparently defendant Pacific Gas and 
Electric 'Co. did not demur. At any rate, 
that is not here important. The third ~md 
fourth causes of action were for defendant 
Bechtel's rtegligen'ce in injuring Cabella, the 
employee, the 'third' asking as damages only 
the amount paid by plaintiff to Cabella for 
workmen's compensation and the fourth 
for additional damages suffered by Cabella. 
The demurrer was sustained as to the 
fourth 'cause only and the judgment entered 
dismissed that cause of action only. T'he 
appeal 'was taken from that judgment. 
That judgment is not appealable for 'tll"ere 
can, .be hut one judgme,nt in an aCtion. 
After trial on the third- cause of action is 
had,' another judgment would be entered. 
That 'is"to say, there cannot ~e separate 
ju'dgments' on d~ffe'rent causes' of action 
whe're the same parties are involved. The 
Judgment' dismissing the fourth cause of 
a'ttion is interlocutory and hence not' ap-
pealable. 'Mather v. Mather,S Cal.2d 617, 
CARTER; Justice. 55 P.2d 1174; Bank of America Nat. Trust 
I dissent. & Savirigs,-i\.'s's:n v. Superior C()urt, 20 Cal. 
The appeal in this case should be dis- 2d 697; 128 P.2d 357; Greenfield v. Mather, 
missed as there is no final judgment, but 14 Ca1.2d 228, 93 P.2d 100; Sjoberg v, 
if the case is to be decided on jtsmerits, Hastorf, 33 Cal.2d 116,199 P.2d 668. The 
the 3-year statute of limitation foraliabili- rule, is stated in Bank ,of America v. Su:. 
ty created by statute is applicable, arid the: perior Court, supra, 20 Cal.2d 697, 701, 128 
judgment should be reversed. Code Civ. P.2d', 357, 360: "They assume that there 
Proc., § 338(1). cal1'be a piecemeal disposition of tb.e 01]. the question of-appeal; it appears,tha:t- seve~al counts of a complaint.' , They as-
there' is yet no final judgment in:the action surn~, when there 'is ~~'re tha~ 'one count 
from which an appeal 'may be taken. The iri a' coinplaint~ and a' deniu~rer is i'nter-
record shows_ that the complaint on file posed and sustained, and a "judgment of ,dis:' ' 
purported' to state four causes 6f action. missal en.tered, that ther:e are: as many sepa-
The, first asserts negligence on the part rate judgments as there ate' ,c'6unts in the, 
of one defendant; Pacific Gas ,and Electric complaint. That is no't the law. There" 
Co., ;resulting in injury to Cabella, an em'" cantlot 'be 'a separat:e judgment 'as to one 
ployee of plaintiff's insured, in the course' count in a complaint ~oi1taining "several 
of his] employment and .. the payment,'of counts. O:n. the contrary" there can he but 
workmen's compensation to him. The" one jUclgment in an, -action no matter how 
second- ·re-alleges· ,th,e allegations' of ,the manY"counts the complaint, contains. De 
first and claims ,Cabella Was damaged by Val1y ,v. Kendall De Vally O. Co., Ltd., 
the injury in the svm, of $50,000 .. In the 220 ,Cal. 742, 32 P.2d 638; Mather v. 
third, the allegations of the first are, again Mather,S Cal.2d 617, 55 P.2d 1174; Potvin 
adopted and it alleges another defendant, , v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc."130 Cal. 
Bechtel, was also negligent, and claim is App. 510, 20 P.2d 129. In the De Vally' 
ma(le' for payments made .for workmen's case,:'supra, a demurrer ,was, sustained and,; 
compens,ation. '; The "fourth, 're-alleges the, a· judgment entered dismissing tWo counts 
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of a four-count complaint. The court The reasoning is faulty. The basic no-
held that the judgment was premature, and tion of one single judgment as stated in all 
dismissed the appeal from it, and stated the cases hereinabove cited is that all the 
(220 Cal. at page 745, 32 P.2d at page 639): factual issues should be settled in one judg-
'Although the matter is not mentioned by ment, unless on a collateral matter one of 
counsel for either side, it appears that the several parties presents issues which are 
court should not have given a judgment finally adjudicated as to him. In the in-
herein until the final disposition of the en- stant case there are not two' parties plain-
tire cause. The law contemplates but one tiff in any true sense because the recovery 
final judgment in a cause. As stated in by plaintiff on either cause of action rests 
the case of Nolan v. Smith, 137 Cal. 360, upon identical issues: Was the defendant 
361,70 P. 166, quoting from Stockton Com- negligent? Was plaintiff's injured em-
bined Harvester & Agricultural Works v. ployee contributively negligent? If de-
Glen Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. (557) 577, 33 fendant was negligent and plaintiff's em-
P. 633: "There can be but one final jl1dg- ployee not, how much damages has the 
ment in an action, and that is one which, latter suffered? Plaintiff as employer is 
in effect, ends the suit in the court in which not entitled to recover any amount on his 
it was entered, and finally determines the own behalf unless he is entitled to recover 
rights of the parties in relation to the mat- on behalf of his employee, and if he is en-
ter in controversy.'" This language was titled to recover on behalf of the latter, the 
approved in the Potvin case, supra, where right of the employer to recover what he 
the court said (130 Ca1.App. at page 512. has paid in compensation and medical ex-
20 P.2d at page 130): 4Since a final judg- penses follows as a matter of coursej there 
ment in an action contemplates a complcte is really no issue on the right to recover 
adjudication of the rights of the parties those two items of damage. Hence there 
and a final determination of the matter in cannot be any finality to a judgment as to 
controversy. it is apparent that the so~called the employer and not as to the employee or 
judgment rendered upon the sustaining of vice versa, whether either or both or one 
a demurrer to one cause of action of a com- or the other is suing. Thus, this is not 
plaint without leave to amend, leaving five in fact a severable action to the extent at 
other- causes of action unimpaired present- least that two judgments arc required or 
ing matters to be litigated during a trial proper. 
of the issues of fact, cannot be regarded as 
a final determination and disposal of thc 
cause.' " 
The majority seeks to escape this rule 
by stating that because plaintiff was suing 
in one capacity in the third count of the 
complaint, that is, in his own right, and in 
the fourth count, as trustee for his injured 
employee, the' judgment entered on the 
fourth 'count is a final judgment. That is 
to say, there could be two final judgments 
in'the case, one on the third count 'and the 
other on· the fourth count. The reason 
given is that it would be like a case where 
two plaintiffs, eaeh seeking damages from 
the same defendant on f~severable" causes 
of action, onc being by the insurance car-
rier for its compensation expenditures and 
the other by the employee for his personal 
injuries. 
264 P.2d-l% 
The law authorizes these causes of ac-
tion to be joined, and it is at least doubtful 
that they could be brought separately. 
Certainly, if they were -brought .separately, 
a judgment on one as to liability would be 
res judicata as to the other. Suppose the 
statute of limitation had not run, could 
plaintiff now bring another action on behalf 
of the employee? It seems obvious to me 
that it could not. Then how can separate 
judgments be rendered in this action if only 
one action could be brought? 
With reference to the statute of limita:. 
tion, the majority holds that inasmuch as a 
personal injury is involved the I-year 
statute, Code Civ.Proc. § 340(3), applies 
rather than the 3~year period for a statu:. 
tory liability. That conclusion is reached 
by construing the provision relating to an 
injury to a person as being special or 
--- --------------------:-----
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particular, whereas the one deating with 
. statutory liability is general and the partic-
ular controls over, the general., The effect 
'of this holding is that every action 'or· pro-
·ceeding mentioned in the limitation statutes 
prevails over the statutory liability provi-
sion regardless of whether the liability is 
or is not created by statute. This is true 
because all of them would be particular, 
like an injury to a person, and thus control-
ling over the ,statutory liability 5ec~ion. 
The result is to give to the statutory liabili-
ty section no more effect than. if it were 
an omnibus or catch~all provision. That it 
was not intended as such is plain. The 
Legislature has exptcssly enacted such a 
:statute. Code Civ.Proc. § 343. The statu4 
:tory liability section -is read out of the books 
as the test is no longer whether or not the 
liability is created by statute, as all the 
previous authorities supposed, it is whether 
there is some other provision fitting the 
case. 
There is no basis for the assumption that 
the personal injury section is particular 
and the statutory liability general. On the 
contrary', there are undoubtedly more of 
the former than of the latter. 
The cases demonstrate that the test of 
whether a liability is_ created by statute 
and thus controlled by the limitation statute, 
is whether, except for the statute there 
would not be liability; the test is not that 
stated by the majority. In Barber v. Mul4 
ford, 117 Cal. 356, 49 P. 206, it Was held 
that a mandamus proceeding to compel the 
payment of a claim against a county based 
on contract was a statutory liability be~ 
cause it was the county's duty -by statute 
to p'ay it. Recovey,Y of commissions by the 
district attorney on moneys collected by 
him' from the county is governed by the 3~ 
year statute, not the 2-year period for lia4 
bilities not founded on a written instru4 
rnent. Higby v. Calaveras County, 18 Cal. 
176. An action on the official bond of an 
officer is controlled by the 3-year statutory 
liability provision although the bond is a 
contract. County of Sonoma v. Hall, 132 
Cal. 589, 62 P. 257, 312, 65 P. 12, 459; 
Norton v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 
176 Cal. 212, 168 P. 16; Hellwig v. Title 
Guaranty & Surety Co., 39 Cal.App. 422, 
179 P. 222 . 
Here it is clear that in the absence' 0'£ 
statute the employer would have no cause 
of action for injuries suffered by his' em'4 
pIoyee, hence, the liability, if any, is created 
by statute, and the 3-year statute of limita:.. 
tion applies. 
SHENK, J., concurs. 
TRAYNOR, Justice. 
I dissent. 
I agree with Mr. Justice CARTER that 
the appeal should be dismissed for the rea-
sons set forth in his opinion. 
o i ~,,"'""'"":::"",,",,:;,,"''"'' , 
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BERGER v. O'HEARN 01 al.' 
s. F. 18539_ 
Supreme Court of California. 
In Banlc. 
Dec. 15, H}:53. 
Rehearing Denied .Tan. 11, 1954. 
Action against administrator of an eS4 
tate to recover an indebtedness allegedly 
due from decedent. The Superior Court, 
San 1y1ateo County, Murray Draper, J., ,sus-
tained defendant's demurrer without leave 
to am~nd, and plaintiff appealed. The SU4 
preme Court, Edmonds, J., held that provi-
sion of Code 0.£ Civil Procedure that if per4 
son against whom action may be brought 
dies before expiration of time liniited for 
commencement thereof, and cause of action 
survives, an action may be commenced 
against his representatives, after expiration 
of that time, and within one year after issu4 
ing of letters testamentary or of admi'nis-
tration, gives a claimant a period of grace 
of one year from the issuance of letters in 
any case in which general statute of limita4 
tions would have expired before end of such 
period, ,but such provision is applicable only 
when necessary to extend a general statute 
of limitations and cannot be used to curtail 
it, and could not serve as basis of claim 
